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THE IDEA OF COUNTERVAILING POWER
This paper will discuss, critique, and revise John Kenneth
Galbraith's 'theory of countervailing power.' Galbraith (1952)
attempted to answer the question: what prevents some organi-
zations in capitalist economic systems from developing market
power, which can control and stifle free economic exchange? In
the 19th century it was thought that competition among busi-
nesses each sharing a small part of the total market would restrict
anyone organization from establishing economic power.
It was assumed ... that the nineteenth-eentury textile manufac-
turer who overcharged for his product would promptly lose his
market to another manufacturer who did not. If all manufac-
turers found themselves in a position where they could exploit
a strong demand, and mark up their prices accordingly, there
would soon be an inflow of new competitors. The resulting
. increase in supply. would bring prices and. profits back to. nor- .
mal (Galbraith, 1952:110).
Galbraith also argued that manufacturers were further check-
ed because those who paid lower wages would in time lose their
labor force to those who paid more. Given similar types of re-
straints for the buyers, a self-regulating mechanism in the econo-
my could be postulated by classical economists. Let us describe
the open competitive market in slightly different terms. This ap-
proach assumes that there is a limited profit range within which
any manufacturer will operate. A company will have an interest in
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remaining in a given business network if it can make a profit
equal to or greater than it can earn through investing (that is, at
least equal to or more than the current bank interest rates).
Moreover, in the open market, other manufacturing competitors
limit how much any company can increase prices of the product
above the current market price. For example, if the current bank
interest rate is 7 percent then we would expect a company to
make more than a 7 percent but less than 9 or 10 percent profit.
Let us consider how this top limit is determined.
When considering a simple model of this market system, it
is first necessary to identify the potential network of economic
relationships, for if one is to understand how anyone economic
actor (in this case a company) is behaving, it is important to
recognize the range of possible choices. (See Figure 1. These and
other figures are in the appendix.)
Now let it be assumed that at a point in time the actual
network of Figure 2 exists. In this case customers K and N are pur-
chasing commodities from two of the three manufacturers:
A and B, and A and C respectively. If A decides to raise the price
of the product then A's customers will turn to Band C who have
maintained lower prices. That is, if K, L, M, and N behave rational-
ly they will seek the lowest price for the desired commodity and
exclude A from the system. Under these conditions manufacturer
A can either lower its price or be forced out of business. This
then is the starting point of a network interpretation of the
self-balancing marketplace.
However, as Galbraith pointed out, with the decline of open
'competition and- rhe development of small groups of extremely
.large. corporations, ..markets are no .longer self-balancing. But he
also contended that it is erroneous to .assume that all forms of
economic restraint on monopolistic market power had vanished.
It is at this point that Galbraith introduces his concept of
countervailing power as a new restraint on what he calls private
(monopolistic) power. Where the old restraint was created by
external pressure of competition, the new form was internally
based and developed by the corporation's customers and/or sup-
pliers. With the development of a few 'strong sellers' by the
concentration of industries in the control of few firms, there
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also developed, unnoticed by economists (but for Galbraith),
'strong buyers.' The fact that large corporations are able to de-
velop monopolistic power (that is, to generate prevailing power) is
the very inducement that motivates customers and suppliers to
create their own defense mechanisms against exploitation.
According to Galbraith, "The opportunity to exercise...
[countervailing] ... power exists only when the suppliers are en-
joying something that can be taken away; i.e., when they are
enjoying the fruits of market power from which they can be
separated" (1952:118). That is, market power can result in profits
above the level that would have been expected in a perfect market.
We will call" this increment in profits prevailing power. To ques-
tion how prevailing power is countervailed and how far that
countervailence can proceed, is to ask how high profit levels can
be reduced and whether they can be reduced to the levels that
would have been typical of a perfect market.
To understand his position, let us begin with a model in-
dicating the potential networks between the manufacturer, the
retailer and the customer (see Figure 3). In reality the retailer
usually deals with a very large potential customer market, but
for simplicity the model will represent all the individual custo-
mers as one aggregate social actor.
To understand countervailing power let us initially focus on
the manufacturer-retailer relationship, and make the assumption
that A has 50 percent of the supplier's market, B 30 percent and
C 20 percent. The basic conditions for an oligopoly are present in
this example. Manufacturer A, having a much larger percentage of
the market, can raise prices in or.der to increase profits. Since A
produces for such a large portion of the market, manufacturers B
and C would not be expected to have either the capabilities or the
capital to take the risk of increasing production in order to absorb
portions of A~s market upon A's price increase, for if A should
suddenly lower its price to its original point or even slightly below
the original price Band/or C would end up with surplus merchan-
dise which might be sufficient to drive them out of business.
Under these conditions it is the retailer that Galbraith identi-
fies as the possible initiator of countervailing power. An example
he refers to is the development oflarge powerful retail enterprises
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such as Sears Roebuck (see Galbraith, 1952:119ff). By using their
market 'power' to purchase large quantities of tires at 25 to 40 per-
cent lower than market value, the tires can be resold then to cus-
tomers at 20 to 25 percent less than the normal retail price. Under
these conditions Sears would have countervailed the power of oli-
gopolistic tire manufacturers such as Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company. Generally Galbraith believes that at the end of most
marketing channels there is a powerful retailer who can counter-
vail the power of the producer. In an attempt to offer lower prices
to customers as a way for maintaining customer markets, large ~e­
tail competitors must deal with the threat of rapid growth of rivals
and/or the appearance of new businesses that would cause a
loss of volume of sales and, in turn, destroy the conditions that
allow that company to offer customers lower prices. Therefore,
Galbraith argues, these large retailers are very sensitive to increased
prices by manufacturers, and they are for this reason motivated to
countervail the power of the manufacturer. With reference to
increased prices, though not always clearly stipulated in his
argument, Galbraith is referring to wholesale prices. However, we
will argue later that large retailers have only a very limited interest
in passing on savings to customers. Finally, it should be remem-
bered that for power to be countervailed there must be prevailing
power evidenced by high prices demanded by high profit mega-
organizations who jointly dominate a market.
LARGE RETAILERS AND FRANCHISED DEALERS
We do "not disagree with' 'Galbraith that'countervaUing power
can occur in the American market, but we do question whether it "
is a major balancing" niechanism, and question further the extent
to which it operates in the interest of the customer. One weakness
in Galbraith's argument is the assumption that retailers must
necessarily act as the consumer's representative (Galbraith, 1952:
117), rather than form a new oligopoly. Whereas in the traditional
free market the manufacturer attempted to minimize costs and
maximize price within the competitive "range, we see the large
retailer's interest is to buy at the lowest price and sell at the
highest possible competitive price. For Galbraith, the retailer
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max1D11ZeS profit by championing the consumers' interests and
therefore receiving their economic support. It is our contention
that the growth of large retailers such as Sears, Safeway, etc., are
new forms of oligopolies and need pass on prices to the consumer
only slightly lower than those otherwise controlled by the manu-
facturer. Therefore, it is in the interest of the large retailer to
have manufacturers, who retail the merchandise through fran-
chised stores and who control prices to those stores, to ultimately
pass on these prices to the consumer. For example, let us assume
that Goodyear sells its tires through its franchised dealership for
$60, and Sears in a large volume, multi-year contract buys the
same tire (with the addition of a Sears' label) from Goodyear
for $30, and sells it for $55 (see Figure 4A) .. If Goodyear raises
its retail price to $65 because of increased manufacturing costs,
materials costs, and a desire for even higher profits, etc., it is in
Sears' interest to' raise its price to $6°and therefore increase its
profit (see Figure 4B).
Perhaps Sears can countervail the market power of Goodyear
through multi-year contracts and has the threat or bargaining
power not to renew them, or to seek a better deal from a competi-
tive manufacturer. In fact Sears can and does purchase foreign
made goods, thus to an extent circumventing u.S. oligopolies. For
example, Sears first purchased its radial tires from a foreign
manufacturer, but once u.S. tire companies began to produce
radials, Sears signed its next contract with one of them. Gal-
braith's theory assumes that Sears would pass on any savings from
the new contract to the customer, but as can be found by contem-
porary price comparisons little or no savings are passed on.. In fact,
it is a common practice of large retailers to make certain minor
specification changes for their"products such that a slightly poorer
quality product at perhaps a lower price is passed on to the
customer. The retailer can then compete against the manufacturer
with a lower-priced, and slightly lower quality item. It seems hard
to argue that this is in the consumer's best interest, or that this
exemplifies the countervailence of market power.
According to Galbraith "[r] etailers are required by their
situation to develop countervailing power on the consumer's
behalf" (Galbraith, 1952:117). Supposedly it is the interest in
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volume sales which causes this 'required' countervailence. But as
we have pointed out this is a wholly erroneous view. The con-
fluence of interest between large retailers and consumers is a
phenomenon of very limited range. Large retailers have an interest
in large volume sales. In pursuit of that interest there are a number
of means which include advertising on the one hand and selling
shoddy goods on the other. Easy access to stores, comprehensive
credit arrangements for consumers, and better service after the
sale are other strategies pursued by large retailers. In short, offer-
ing lower prices to the consumer and thus countervailing the
power of large manufacturers, is only one among many strategies
available to large retailers to keep volume sales.
Furthermore, even when lower prices is the strategy pursued
by large retailers, the confluence of interest between them and the
consumer is very limited. The retailer has an economic interest
in offering prices which were sufficiently lower than other retailers
to attract business from them. Beyond that point the large re-
tailer has no interest whatsoever in offering lower prices to the
consumer. As pointed out above, this means that if manufac-
turers have the power to raise prices in other retail outlets, then
the large retailer has an interest in readjusting his prices upward
to a point again just sufficiently below that of other retailers to
attract volume business. The image which Galbraith draws is one
of large retailers stoutly defending the .interests of customers.
Clearly this image is wrong-headed.
If the extent of confluence of interest between large retailers
and consumers is at most limited to a small and constantly re-
adjusting price advantage, itself determined by prevailing -prices,
then the central .issue to be considered is how_pr~d:ucers co~­
trol their markets. If it is found that producers have themeans
to set .prices largely as they choose, if there are means by which
they can insulate themselves from consumer power outside their
relationships to large retailers, then, as we have seen from the
foregoing discussion, that power will not be countervailed to any
significant extent by large retailers. This same point can be stated
in terms of market prices. If manufacturers can set prices at such
a point that very large profits will result, then they have stro.ng
prevailing power, only a small increment of which will, at most,
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be countervailed by large retailers. Therefore, let us tum to the
consideration of one of the mechanisms by means of which large
producers do insulate themselves from countervailing power.
FRANCHISED DEALERS, PREVAILING POWER,
AND INSULATION FROM COUNTERVAILING POWER
As even the most casual observation of contemporary eco-
nomic practice will indicate, a typical marketing system of mono-
poly and oligopoly capital is to sell first to franchised dealers
who in turn sell to consumers. As we analyze this two-stage
exchange system it will be seen that one of its effects is to insulate
large capital from the consumer in such a way that the prevailing
power exerted by large capital over its franchised dealers is not
countervailed. This structure is then the system which determines
prevailing prices and in tum determines the price from which
large retailers do, at times, deviate slightly. Since, as we will show,
one consequence of this system is that prices to dealers and thus
to consumers can be set within very broad limits at the price
desired by large capital, no effective' countervailence will occur.
In Figure 5 we have represented the network connecting a
large capitalist corporation such as General Motors with a subset
of five of its dealers and have represented the consumers who buy
from those dealers by a large box below that set. Furthermore, we
have superimposed upon this actual network a subset of potential
dealers who could under certain conditions be brought into the
network by the corporation to displace any of the existing dealers.
, ---As Leonard and Weber (1977:137ff)~imply,large auto manufac-
turers act to encourage new dealers .to enter the network of
existing. dealers displacing those already established. 'Th~re are -
training schools for new dealers established by the corporation
and financial aid to new dealers is made available by the corpor-
ation. As a consequence there is what could well be called a
'reserve army' of dealers ready and waiting to be included in the
franchising system. Who are these people? Clearly they come from
a variety of origins: salesmen of existing dealers, shop managers,
local dealers with an interest in expansion to further dealerships
and local members of the business class. But who they are matters
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less than the fact that such a reserve army of potential dealers
does exist.
As Marx pointed out in Capital (Marx, 1967:637ff) the effect
of the reserve industrial army is to depress wages to the lowest
possible level. In other words the existence of the reserve indus-
trial army of proletarians allowed the capitalist to set the price of
labor at the point desired by the capitalist and independent of
the wills of any individual proletarian. Similarly, the effect of
the reserve army of dealers is that corporations can set prices to
dealers at the desired point and independent of the wills of in-
dividual dealers. Of course, in this instance the consequence is to
set prices as high as desired. Furthermore, as we shall see, the
effect of this structure is, beyond price fixing, to place a number
of further burdens on the franchised dealer. However, before
proceeding to those effects let us consider the dynamics of the
network and its effects.
Let us consider the instance of a given dealer who wants
to gain a better price from the corporation for the cars (or for
any other commodity) which he buys. Since there are potential
dealers in the system, the corporation can, at little or no cost,
simply refuse the bargain with that dealer (as a capitalist could
refuse to bargain with any worker in the presence of a reserve
industrial army) and instead could threaten to displace the dealer
in favor of one from the potential network. Similarly, consider a
dealer who wanted to resist the imposition of high prices. Again
such resistance would have no base in the structure due to the
ease of his displacement. Thus, the dealer is not in a position to
countervail the 'power- of-the corporation.sand instead can be
expected to ~ccept the demanded price and attempt to pass it
on to the consumer, quite regardless 'of what that price is.
Now let us turn to the effect of contracts in the relations
between the corporation and its dealers. Let it be assumed that the
contract has N clauses each of which can be written either in the
interest of the corporation or in the interest of the dealer. Given
the structure of the system a result similar to the one found in
the case of prices would be expected, such that all N clauses would
be written in the interest of the corporation.
One clause which is an element of any contract is the dura-
tion over which it is binding. Such a clause can also specify the
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conditions under which either party to the contract can withdraw.
Again if these elements are drawn in the interest of the corpor-
ation, the effect of the structure as it existed at a given point T
is extended over the time period of the contract..Thus, for any
one contractual relationship between a corporation and its dealer,
only at the point at which the contract is negotiated and signed
need there be a reserve army of dealers. Once the contract is
signed under that structural condition, the power exercise can
be sustained for the period of the contract regardless of whether
the structure is or is not maintained! Thus, the first effect of the
contract is to sustain the prevailing power over dealers beyond
the structure over the time period of the contract.
Given the first effect, a second effect follows. Consider
the larger network of N dealers. For any given time period, let it
be assumed that all but one are under (long term) contract. That
one dealer is now entering into negotiations for a new contract.
Thus, only that one dealer faces the whole of the reserve army
of dealers which can brought to bear. Thus, his structural position
is very disadvantageous. Consequently, since dealers need be
contracted only at intervals, the corporation can maintain its
power position through only a very small set of potential dealers.
In light of the foregoing let us turn to the situation of the
consumer. Since 'wholesale' prices have been fixed to all dealers
with whom he can do business, it follows that the best price that
the consumer can obtain is one only slightly higher than that
wholesale price. Thus, the power which was exerted over the
dealers by means of the reserve army of dealers is passed directly
. on to the ·-consumer. Thus, power .over dealersresolves itself into
power ove! consumers, a prevailing power' which is not counter-
vailed.
The fact that mega-organizations can establish prevailing
power over their dealer networks and consequently over the con-
sumer is of the greatest possible importance as will be seen as we
move to the consideration of the relationship between dealers and
consum-ers for, contrary to what might be expected, it is again the
dealer who is in a disadvantaged position. In order to under-
stand that position it will be assumed in the following that the
consumer has a set of dealers from whom he can buy and knows
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the wholesale price of the commodity. (In the case of autos, for
example, this latter information is easily available.)
The consumer needs to buy only one car, but there are a
larger number of dealers to whom he can go. Were anyone of
these dealers to refuse to give in and sell at the price only slightly
higher than the wholesale price, the consumer could go elsewhere.
As a consequence the set of consumers are in a position, if they
act rationally, to playoff the set of dealers against one another.
By iterating between dealers the price paid can be expected to be
little more than the wholesale price. In fact, anyone who has
bought a car this way knows how the system works and knows its
effects. Thus, again, the dealer finds himself in a disadvantaged
position. .
However, the advantaged position of the consumer is over
the dealer alone, and does not extend beyond him to the cor-
poration. Thus, even the most rational buyer cannot affect the
wholesale prices which had already been set by the mega-
organization, and since he cannot, prevailing power has been
exercised over him.
SOME PROPOSITIONS AND SUPPORTIVE EVIDENCE
The foregoing interpretation followed from a formulation for
a two-stage exchange relationship. The question which now arises
is what kind of empirical evidence would support this formu-
lation? At least the following empirical propositions fall out of
the foregoing analysis as it is applied to automotive two-stage
exchange networks: -' --, - " - . ,
(1 ) The .profits enjoyed by at least the largest manufacturers
would be expected to be' far above the level expected were' their
power to have been countervailed.' .
(2) Contracts between manufacturers and dealers would be
highly advantageous to the former.
(3) Franchised dealers' profits per auto sold could be ex-
pected in at least some cases to be very low, and on the whole not
to he high (the expected level being dependent upon the rational-
ity of buyers).
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One further proposition could be added if it is the case that
dealers are squeezed between the corporation and the consumer.
Then, it could be inferred that other sources of profit would be
sought by dealers. In fact there is support for all of the foregoing
empirical propositions.
Discussion of Proposition 1: Leonard and Weber (1977:
141) indicate that during the period from 1960 to 1967 General
Motors earned 20.5 percent annual profit on investments, Ford
Motor Company earned 14.3 percent, and Chrysler Corporation
earned 11.8 percent. These data, when compared to Proposition
3's data below, clearly indicate the lack of any countervailing
influence of the dealers. According to Vanderwicken (see Farber-
man, 1977:452) who studied medium-sized dealerships in deve-
land, Ohio, auto dealers have earned less than one percent on
sales.
Discussion of Proposition 2: Auto franchised dealers operate
under very restrictive agreements with the auto manufacturers
(Leonard and Weber, 1977:137). of course, in part this is due to
their dependency upon the manufacturers for the initial capital
loans to establish the agency. In these contracts the manufac-
turer sets the terms of the selling agreement, which requires the
dealer to sell and service that line of cars, stock parts, meet mini-
mum sales quotas established by the manufacturer, and allow the
manufacturer to cancel franchises for violations of certain condi-
tions. White refers to this relationship as a 'forcing model,' where
the manufacturer places the dealer under tremendous pressure
to sell the autos as fast as possible, since the dealer's capital is
tiedup .in 'unsold' tats ; and/or loaninterest rates which accrue for
the cars sittingon thelot (Farberman, 197_7,:150).
Discussion of Proposition 3: As previously mentioned, car
dealers earn a minuscule margin of profit on the sale of new
goods-far below' that of independent retail businesses. Vander-
wicken (Farberman, 1977:452) provides an example from a
medium-sized agency in Cleveland, where a new car was sold for
$3,337, of which $3,025 was paid to the manufacturer, $90 for
the salesperson's commission, $43 for wages and salaries, $30
for advertising, $28 for loans and interest, $27 for miscellaneous,
$24 for taxes, $22 for rent and maintenance, $16 for dealer
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preparation and pre-delivery work, $9 for free customer service,
$7 for employee benefits, leaving a new profit of $16 for the new
car. The additional dealer's obligation of providing maintenance
service can be viewed as a 'necessary evil' to maintain the fran-
chise, since the franchise contract strictly limits service charges
and profits. It is not surprising that some dealers' reaction to
this obligation is to attempt to turn it into a more profitable
operation by illegal means. As reported in a Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee hearing in December 1968, a series of criminal
activities related to auto dealership service practices have been
identified, such as charging for labor time not actually expended,
billing for unnecessary repairs, or repairs not performed, and using
rebuilt parts and charging for· new ones. Similar illegal schemes
have been discovered oriented towards duping the manufacturer
with reference to new car warranties for parts and services.
Farberman (1977 :454) argues that the criminal behavior of the
auto retailers is a direct cOIJ.sequence of the system imposed by the
limited number of oligopolist auto manufacturers.
CONCLUSION
Though it has been over two decades since Galbraith wrote
American Capitalism, it can be argued that he should have then
recognized the predominance of large capital. Before 1920 Max
Weber (1953:325) pointed out that Standard oil had total domi-
nation over gas dealerships, a time at which Galbraith considered
countervailing power to be developing. Weber stated that owners
(manufacturers) could maintain .even partial monopolies if they
could _'prescribe' prices tc? both exchange partners and cornpeti-
tors, i.e.," ... if by [their] own conduct, they could impose upon
[exchange partners and competitors] a way of conduct according
to [their] own interests, without ... imposing on them the
slightest 'obligation' to submit to this domination" (Weber, 1953:
325).
Galbraith failed to describe the structures and processes
through which corporations protect themselves from counter-
vailence. Consequently, he presents a one-sided view and has
obscured how countervailence is neutralized in our society.
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Manufacturers
Figure 1: Potential Network of the Open Market System
Manufacturers
L
Customers
Figure 2: An Actual Network of the Open Market
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